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Abstract
This paper proposes urbanization as a determinant of government size. As people move
to cities, their demand for a more defined set of regulations, but also for basic health,
education, and income standards rises. Our theoretical framework determines how the
regional distribution of the population affects government size. We test this theory on
panel data of 175 countries from 1960 to 2010 and two state-level samples from Colombia
and Germany. Results demonstrate a strong positive effect from urbanization on gov-
ernment spending, with a 1 percent increase in the amount of urban citizens leading to
a 0.2 percent rise in public expenditure. Our findings indicate that public sectors may
become more important as worldwide urbanization is progressing. This result underlines
why government effectiveness and the quality of public goods provision will be even more
important in the future.
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“What I like about cities is that everything is king size, the beauty and the ugliness.”
Joseph Brodsky (1940 – 1996), Russian poet and essayist.
1. Introduction
The global population has more than doubled since 1960, from 3 billion to over 6.8
billion people. At the same time, rapid urbanization has taken place. Today, half of the
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world population lives in cities, compared to 37 percent in 1975. As population is predicted
to keep growing, so is urbanization. The U.N. anticipates the global urbanization rate to
hit 57 percent for the year 2025 (see figures 1 – 3).1 At the same time, global government
spending relative to GDP has steadily been rising, from an average of 11.7 percent in 1960
to 16.5 percent in 2009.2 The following pages will argue that there exists an intimate
connection between urbanization and the shape of the public sector.
In the related public economics literature, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) show why total
population growth can lower government consumption per capita. With consumption of
pure public goods being non-rival, per capita costs decrease when spread out over more
people. Our paper asks what happens to public spending if people are increasingly living
in urban areas.
A city lifestyle differs fundamentally from living in a rural area. Being surrounded
by more people in a densely populated area, the opportunity for interaction increases, in
professional as well as in private settings. The average urban citizen interacts with more
people, but also faces more anonymity. In fact, somebody living in an urban apartment
building may cross paths with her in-house neighbors every day, yet never know their
names. Daily interactions are bound to be more formal, whereas the traditional small
town is oftentimes characterized by “everybody knows everybody.” We argue that as
people are living closer together, they naturally seek a more structured and detailed
organization of society.
Consider the example of playing loud music at home. If one lives in a rural house
surrounded by a spacious yard, the first neighbors likely do not live close enough to
potentially be bothered. Yet in an inner-city apartment complex the chances of complaints
increase substantially. In the latter case, society is eventually more likely to enforce
existing regulations and to create new ones. As another example, imagine a minor traffic
accident. In a small town, both parties possibly know each other and may settle the
dispute without involving authorities. An accident on Times Square however involves the
police, shutting off the street, and maybe a sequel in court. The difference lies in the
involvement of public institutions. Many issues in a small town do not carry externalities
1See Dugger (2007) for a more detailed exposition in the NY Times. The detailed urbanization maps
can be found at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/maps_1_2025.htm.
2Numbers derived from a balanced worldwide data set on national government spending (World Bank).
These numbers only report public spending on the national level, without considering regional or local
government spending.
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and are more likely to be resolved informally, whereas the anonymity of a city requires
well-defined public institutions. Other goods, which gain relevance in urban areas and
are usually provided by the public sector include transportation (e.g. a metro system and
airports) or dealing with environmental issues. For instance, Henderson (2005) notes that
cities require enormous public infrastructure investments. Setting up and maintaining a
public transportation system is a costly job which governments are bound to execute in
most societies. As for the environmental aspect, problems with pollution generally arise
in urbanized areas first.
Another notable distinction between urban and rural areas lies in the awareness of
income gaps, but also differences in health and education standards. Taking the metro,
one likely sees several different neighborhoods, in addition to the variety of people in the
metro itself.3 The visibility of people with lower income, health, and education levels
may naturally result in a stronger urge for security, but also in a heightened sense for
redistribution. In addition, there are substantial external factors at play, specifically
regarding health care. In a densely populated area, a universal health standard comes
with increased positive externalities, as diseases can be passed along much quicker. In
summary, city life differs fundamentally from a rural lifestyle and the demand for public
goods may be bigger in urban areas, everything else equal.
Notice that these implications are neither related to population size nor to population
density. For example, consider two countries with similar land areas and population sizes,
like Denmark and Slovakia. Denmark counts 4 cities with more than 100,000 people,
whereas Slovakia only counts 2. Population density is very similar, yet the concentration
in cities is more prevalent in Denmark. Thus, Denmark should have higher per capita
government spending as a fraction of GDP (which it has), if everything else were equal.
Finally, one cannot rule out a potential element of self-selection in this context. Somebody
who chooses to live in a city may well differ from a rural habitant in terms of her genuine
understanding of the social contract. Thus, people’s personal attitude could affect both
the urbanization rate and the size of government.
There exists an extensive literature discussing urbanization. For instance, Ravallion
(2002) and Glaeser et al. (2008) discuss poverty in the context of urbanization, whereas
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) provide an excellent analysis of urbanization in the United
3For instance, trains in Tokyo move 8 million people everyday with so-called “trainpackers” trying to
fit as many people into wagons as possible.
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States. Other region-specific analyses include Hope (1998) for Africa, Weber and Puissant
(2003) for Tunis, Zhang and Song (2003) and Chen (2007) for China. Henderson (2003)
argues for an ideal individual degree of urbanization, depending on size and development
of a country. Further, urbanization has been labeled as a growth engine (Zhang, 2002,
or Bertinelli and Black, 2004), although Henderson (2005) or Bloom et al. (2008) find a
weaker effect on growth. For a detailed analysis of urbanization and growth, one might
consider Henderson (2005).
Similarly, the literature on government size suggests a list of potential determinants.
Several political aspects have been considered, as well as deindustrialization, openness to
trade, or the increase in female labor force participation.4 Looking at living standards,
Wagner’s Law comes to mind, suggesting that higher income is accompanied by a bigger
government.5 Meltzer and Richard (1981) provide a theoretical model relating income
inequality to government size, challenged by Gouveia and Masia (1998) in an empirical
framework. In a comprehensive empirical analysis, Shelton (2007) compares the relative
importance of various determinants of government size. The paper closest to our approach
however is Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), who argue that more populated countries benefit
from economies of scale, therefore incurring lower public spending on a per capita basis.
We extend this analysis in distinguishing between the urban and rural population, sug-
gesting an independent effect from the regional distribution of population on government
spending.
We derive a general theoretical framework modeling the demand for public and pri-
vate goods, both by urban and rural citizens. We then provide a theoretical example,
employing a CES utility function. Our results suggest that urbanization increases the
size of government, irrespective of the degree of substitutability between public and pri-
4Mueller and Murrell (1986) analyze the influence of interest groups and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)
suggests that the size of the legislature might be negatively related to government size. Recently, Brender
and Drazen (2013) look at the effect of elections on changes in government spending. Lind (2007)
considers inequality within versus across groups. Regarding the argument for fiscal decentralization,
one might consider Marlow (1988), Grossman (1989), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Jin and Zou (2002),
and Cassette and Paty (2010). Iversen and Cusack (2000) propose deindustrialization as a driver of
government expenditure. Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) discusses the increased participation of women
in the labor force as a potential determinant. Finally, Rodrik (1998) started the discussion on trade
openness as a potential determinant of government size, which has since been debated heavily.
5For instance, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) find mixed results for Wagner’s Law in a long-time
study of government spending in Sweden and England. Bru¨ckner et al. (2012) uses oil price shocks to
analyze the elasticity of government spending and its components over time.
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vate goods.6
Our empirical section consists of two main parts: (1) an international panel data anal-
ysis from 1960 – 2010 and (2) two state-level samples from Colombia and Germany. Our
theoretical predictions receive strong support in all three samples as urbanization has a
positive and significant effect on government spending. In terms of magnitude, our re-
sults suggest that a 1 percent increase in the number of urban people raises government
spending by 0.15 – 0.30 percent. Although strongly significant in either specification, gov-
ernment spending seems to respond with over three times the impact in OECD countries
(elasticity of up to 0.65) versus non-OECD countries (elasticity of 0.18). Further, urban-
ization seems to increase public spending on health and education, but has no impact on
military spending. Finally, our state-level panel data analyses of Colombia and Germany
confirm our general result: urbanization seems to make governments bigger.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework, followed by the empirical methodology in section 3. Section 4 discusses our
data and their sources. Finally, section 5 presents our empirical findings and section 6
concludes.
2. Theory
This section proposes a basic theoretical framework, focusing on society’s demand for
the public good (g) and the private good (c). The novel feature of the model lies in
the distinction between urban and rural citizens. We first introduce a general framework
and then provide a theoretical application, using a CES utility framework. We want to
be clear in stating that our focus is neither explaining why people move to the city nor
providing a complete list of government size determinants.7
2.1. General Model
Think of a country with two distinct geographical regions: an urban area populated
by s citizens and a rural area with a population of n people. Thus, total population of
our model country is s+ n = P . To facilitate readability, a reverse upper hat will denote
variables concerning the urban area (e.g. g˘), whereas variables from the rural area are
6The model introduced by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) suggests that the effect of population size on
government spending per capita depends on the substitutability between public and private goods.
7For theoretical frameworks on explaining rural-urban migration and the developments of cities, one
might consider Lucas Jr (2004) or Duranton (2007).
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marked by a dot (e.g. g˙). The urban area is defined by a limited geographical space of
size Φ˘, whereas the rural area is characterized by an unlimited geographical space of size
Φ˙ with Φ˙→∞.
Suppose further that any person interacts with a fraction of people in their respective
area in a given period. We label this fraction  (with 0 <  < 1) and, if available space
plays a role in how many people one interacts with, then  = (Φ), where  ∈ {˘, ˙} and
Φ ∈ {Φ˘, Φ˙}.8 With space being infinite in the rural area, we impose that ˙ converges to
˙ =
k
n
, (A.1)
where k denotes a positive constant. Thus, the total amount of personal interactions by
a rural citizen becomes ˙n = k. We further assume that there exists an urban population
threshold s = s∗ after which urban citizens have more interactions than rural citizens and
˘s > k. (A.2)
With our previous discussion about differences between urban and rural areas in mind,
we consider the case of s > s∗, fulfilling A.2.
2.1.1. An Urban Citizen
All urban citizens are equivalent in preferences and budget constraint with a typical
urban citizen choosing g˘ and c˘ to maximize
U = U
[
g˘(˘, s), c˘
]
. (1)
Following our discussion, we impose that the demand for the public good is a positive
function of the amount of interactions (g˘˘ > 0 and g˘s > 0), but this effect diminishes with
size (g˘˘˘ < 0 and g˘ss < 0). We establish the usual conditions of diminishing marginal
utility with Uj > 0 and Ujj < 0 for j ∈ {c˘, g˘}. The sign of Uc˘g˘ determines whether public
and private goods are substitutes or complements.9 An urban person’s budget constraint
8To simplify the analysis, we exclude the possibility of interactions across areas. Without loss of
generality, one could allow for interactions across regions and our general results remain unaffected.
9For a recent theoretical framework on this question, one might look at Gal´ı et al. (2007). For empirical
approaches concerning the substitutability of public and private goods, consider Karras (1994), Evans
and Karras (1996) or Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) among others.
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is given by
y˘ = pg˘ + qc˘ (2)
with y˘, p, and q representing the individual income of an urban citizen and universal
prices of the respective goods. Finally, we include the intuition of the non-rival public
good (following Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), which translates to its price being a function
of total population size:
p = p(s+ n), (3)
where ps+n < 0. Given the non-rivalry of public good consumption, a bigger population
lowers the price for the individual. Maximizing (1) with respect to (2) then defines the
optimal demand for both goods, which can be expressed by the general form of
Uc˘
Ug˘
=
q
p
. (4)
2.1.2. A Rural Citizen
A rural citizen faces a similar problem, maximizing
V = V
[
g˙(k), c˙
]
(5)
subject to
y˙ = pg˙ + qc˙. (6)
Here again, the importance of the public good increases with the amount of interactions
(g˙k > 0 and g˙kk < 0). The assumption of the non-rival public good from equation (3)
holds on the countryside as well. From here, the ideal basket of goods will be determined
by the optimality condition
Vc˙
Vg˙
=
q
p
. (7)
2.1.3. The Effect of Urbanization on Government Spending
Our equation of interest is relative government size, i.e. the relative demand for the
public good. Labeling total consumption of the public good with pG and total income
7
with Y , we can write government spending as a fraction of GDP as
pG
Y
=
p
(
sg˘ + ng˙
)
sy˘ + ny˙
. (8)
Now consider an urbanization process: ∆s = −∆n. Notice that the effect of population
size on the price of the public good from equation (3) cancels out as overall population
remains unchanged.10 The change in relative government spending then comes out to be
(
G
Y
)s − (G
Y
)n =
1
Y
[
sg˘s +
P y˘y˙
Y
(
g˘
y˘
− g˙
y˙
)]
. (9)
We can distinguish two effects:
• The first term, sg˘s, is positive by definition and stems from all urban citizens, who
now feel the city getting more crowded. As a consequence, they raise their demand
for the public good.
• The second term, P y˘y˙
Y
(
g˘
y˘
− g˙
y˙
)
, comes from the relative importance of the public
good in both areas. For instance, if urban citizens generally devote a larger fraction
of their income to the public good than rural citizens ( g˘
y˘
> g˙
y˙
), this term becomes
positive.
Although we cannot draw conclusive results regarding the net effect from urbanization
on the size of the public sector, this exercise gives us an idea of the forces at work. The
following example will provide further insights.
2.2. A Theoretical Example
The theoretical example follows Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) in assuming constant
elasticity of substitution (CES utility) between both goods. We first need to define how
the amount of interactions enters preferences. To this end, we introduce the parameter
δ (with 0 < δ < 1), measuring the importance of security, redistribution, regulation or
generally the definition of the social contract to any individual. We assume all citizens to
be equal in their δ.
10So we can simplify equation (7) to GY =
sg˘+ng˙
sy˘+ny˙ for this exercise. Please also see the appendix for
exact derivations.
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2.2.1. An Urban Citizen – CES Example
An urban citizen has to choose g˘ and c˘ to maximize
U =
[(
˘s
)δ
(g˘)α + (c˘)α
] 1
α
, (10)
where α denotes the degree of substitutability between both goods.11 When the city
becomes more crowded (s increases) the importance of the public good increases, but at a
decreasing rate (since δ < 1). With the non-rivalry condition of the public good in mind,
we denote the price for the public good by p = γ
s+n
and the price for the private good by
q = µ. γ and µ (with γ, µ > 0) represent exogenous production parameters, determined by
capital or technology for instance. The typical urban citizen’s budget constraint becomes
y˘ =
γ
s+ n
g˘ + µc˘. (11)
The urban citizen’s optimal demand for the public good in terms of her income is then
given by
pg˘
y˘
=
1
1 + ( γ
µ
)
α
1−α
(
˘s
) δ
α−1
(
s+ n
) α
α−1
=
1
1 + A
, (12)
where we adopt the notation of A to facilitate readability in the upcoming results.
2.2.2. A Rural Citizen – CES Example
Similarly, a rural inhabitant chooses g˙ and c˙ to maximize
V =
[
(k)δ(g˙)α + (c˙)α
] 1
α
(13)
subject to
y˙ =
γ
s+ n
g˙ + µc˙. (14)
11We assume α < 1. For α → ∞ goods are complements, whereas α = 1 corresponds to the case of a
unit elasticity of substitution.
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Thus, income levels may differ across regions, but prices are the same. Also note that the
public good is non-rival nationwide.12 Maximization of (13) leads to
pg˙
y˙
=
1
1 + ( γ
µ
)
α
1−α (k)
δ
α−1
(
s+ n
) α
α−1
=
1
1 +B
, (15)
where B is introduced to simplify notation. We can already tell that an urban citizen has
a higher relative consumption of the public good than a rural citizen, as assumption A.1
leads to A < B for any α < 1.
2.2.3. The Effect of Urbanization on Government Spending – CES Example
As in our general model, consider the case where people move from the countryside
to the city: ∆s = −∆n. Using the general form of (9), we can rewrite the effect of
urbanization as
(
G
Y
)s − (G
Y
)n =
1
Y
[
sg˘s +
P 2y˘y˙
γY
(pg˘
y˘
− pg˙
y˙
)]
(16)
where the first term picks up the increased importance of the public good for all urban
citizens after the city becomes more crowded.13 The second term in brackets represents
the switch of the moving citizens from consuming g˙ to g˘.
Using our results from (12) and (15) and deducting g˘s from (12) allows us to specify
the result from urbanization. Since g˘s > 0 for any α < 1 and A < B, urbanization causes
government spending as a fraction of GDP to increase for any degree of substitutability.
For the demonstration why g˘s > 0, please see the appendix. This non-dependence on
the elasticity of substitution is a more explicit result than the effect of total population
on government size, suggested by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). The following empirical
section will now take our theoretical predictions to the data.
12This assumption could be relaxed if one focuses on a federal republic like the United States or
Germany, where states carry a stronger role in the provision of public goods. Since our main empirical
part only contains a small fraction of such federal systems, we focus on the public good being non-rival
across domestic regions.
13Notice that g˙s−g˙n = 0 since total population P remains unchanged in the case of a strict urbanization,
a move from the rural area to an urban area: ∆s = −∆n. The same argument holds for the term (s+n)
in the denominator of g˘, derived from equation 12.
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3. Empirical Methodology
Although the general theoretical framework only provides an intuition on the effects of
urbanization, the CES example is more concrete to predict a positive effect of urbanization
on government spending. Our estimable equation is derived directly from the definition
of government spending in (8). Using the results from (12) and (15), total government
spending becomes
pG =
sy˘
1 + ( γ
µ
)
α
1−α (˘s)
δ
α−1 (s+ n)
α
α−1
+
ny˙
1 + ( γ
µ
)
α
1−α (k)
δ
α−1 (s+ n)
α
α−1
. (17)
Thus, we can express government spending in the following way:
gov = F
(
˘s, s+ n, sy˘, ny˙
)
= F
(
urban, pop, gdp
)
, (18)
where gov stands for total government spending; pop, gdp, and urban represent total
population, overall GDP, and the amount of urban people. From equation (17), we
predict positive effects from income and urban population, yet the effect from the overall
population depends on the degree of substitutability (α), as in Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998). We estimate the following panel model across countries (or regions in the national
samples):
lgovit = β0 + β1lurbanit + β2lpopit + β3lgdpit + β4Xit + αi + λt + it. (19)
In order to simplify comparison and interpretation of the obtained coefficients, all variables
are taken in natural logarithm (indicated by an l before a variable name). lgov and lurban
stand for total government expenditure and the urban population, whereas lpop and lgdp
represent the overall population and overall GDP.
Xit contains additional control variables, which have been found to be important in de-
termining government size. In the international sample we use openness to trade (lopen),
life expectancy (llife), the fractions of people over 65 years of age (pop65) and under
15 (pop15) in society, and the Polity IV index (polity), measuring a country’s degree
of democratization.14 αi and λt capture country- and time-fixed effects. These dummy
variables seem particularly important, given the vast differences in terms of history, ge-
14For an excellent overview of why these variables can determine government spending, one might look
at Shelton (2007).
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ography, and any other unique national aspects of every individual country around the
world. For the Colombian and German samples, data availability does not include lopen,
pop65, pop15, and polity, although these variables may not differ substantially across
regions and time in a domestic setting anyway. In addition, we do not have state-level
information of llife for Germany.
4. Data Sources and Description
Overall, we are using 3 distinct data sets, which are summarized in table 1. The
following sections discuss each data set separately.
4.1. International Data
All our international data comes from the World Development Indicators, with the ex-
ception of the Polity IV index. We use final general government consumption expenditure
(in constant 2000 US$), which exclusively contains data for the central government, as our
dependent variable. Our preferred measurement would be overall government spending,
including public administration on the local and regional level. Although imperfect, we
have several reasons to believe that using central government spending is a close proxy
for total government size. First, only 17 countries in our sample are federal republics
– a state form which allows for stronger decentralization of government decisions. Sec-
ond, most of our above described effects should go through the national arm of public
spending as opposed to a regional district, such as the extent of universal health care or
redistributional policies.15 Third, the distinction between regional and national govern-
ment spending should matter mostly in rich and populous countries, since smaller and
poorer countries cannot allow for several layers of public administration, simply owed to
their size and the setup costs for government institutions. Fourth, fixed effects should
partially control for some of the international variation in terms of the distribution of
government spending between central and regional administration.
The World Bank measures the urban population as the number of people living in
urban areas, as defined by national statistical offices.16 We use total urban population
as opposed to the urbanization rate given that the urbanization rate is missing for many
15The United States might be a popular exception.
16Although there could be differences across countries and time in the interpretation of an urban area,
fixed effects should be able to control for this variation.
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countries in the database even though urban population is not. Further, the use of the
absolute measure or the relative measure will provide exactly the same coefficient estimate
in a linear model. Population is the total population of a country. Regarding additional
control variables, the World Bank measures GDP as total GDP (in constant 2000 US$),
openness as exports plus imports divided by GDP, and life expectancy as life expectancy
at birth. Further, we use the population shares over the age of 65 and under the age of
15. Finally, the Polity IV index measures a country’s degree of democratization from −10
(totally autocratic) to +10 (total democracy).
In an extension to our general estimations, we also look at specific areas of govern-
ment size. Specifically, we use public spending on education, health, and military to see
whether our suggested effect from urbanization holds across different sections of govern-
ment spending.
A preview of our international data in figure 4 confirms that average cross country
urbanization has been increasing constantly over time, as well as average national gov-
ernment spending as a fraction of GDP. While this graph is purely suggestive, it does
intimate that these two variables may be closely associated.
Lastly, in addition to about 5,000 yearly observations, we also create a sample apply-
ing five year averages to all variables. This follows previous works, such as Shelton (2007)
or Ram (2009), and aims at controlling for potential problems of measurement error,
business cycles, and exogenous shocks. As some observations might suffer from measure-
ment error (especially older observations and data points from developing economies),
averaging provides a useful control for results from using annual values. In addition, if
some regressors move slowly over time, then using annual data might not provide enough
variation to filter out the respective effect, especially when controlling for country- and
time-fixed effects.17
4.2. National Data Sets
Our national samples use state-level data from within Colombia and Germany. Data
for Colombia is extracted from the DANE website (Departamento Administrativo Na-
cional de Estad´ıstica), whereas data from the German Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt) and Eurostat allow us to analyze the formation of regional government spend-
17Shelton (2007) provides a detailed explanation why using averaged observations can be helpful in
this context.
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ing in Germany.18
The Colombian sample ranges from 1985 – 2007 for all 25 regions and we are using
current government spending (in millions of pesos) to measure the size of the public
sector.19 We use the amount of people living in the main city of the specific state to
proxy for urbanization. Although not equivalent to the general definition of urbanization,
it captures the concept – especially given the strong concentration in one city for most
Colombian regions.20 Finally, we control for state-level population and GDP (measured
nominally in millions of pesos).
In the case of Germany, we have data from 1996 – 2010 for 13 out of 16 federal states,
missing Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg, although their inclusion would not add much infor-
mation anyway with their respective urbanization rates being at 100 percent by definition.
The extent of the state-level public sector is measured as total government spending in
Euros. The amount of households living in densely-populated areas, defined as areas
with at least 500 inhabitants per square kilometer, provides us with a measurement for
urbanization. Although this variable strays from the definition of urbanization counting
individuals, one could easily think of our theoretical model being derived for households.
For consistency, we also employ the overall amount of households as our variable defining
population size. Finally, we control for state level GDP in Euros.
5. Empirical Findings
In this section, we present our main cross country findings along with several robust-
ness checks, followed by the Colombian and German country-specific studies. Throughout
all tables, we subsequently add control variables moving from left to right.
5.1. Cross Country Analysis of Government Spending
Table 2 displays our benchmark results. We see that in the generic pooled model both
urban and total population have large and statistically meaningful effects on government
18For Colombia, the data is available at http://www.dane.gov.co/. Our German data comes from
https://www.regionalstatistik.de, https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online?nsc=
true&https=1, and http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/.
19Technically, Colombia consists of 32 regions, but 8 of them are summarized in the DANE data set to
one remaining region. These regions are Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainia, Guaviare, Putumayo,
San Andre´s and Providencia, Vaupe´s, and Vichada.
20Ades and Glaeser (1995) provide potential reasons why especially South American societies tend to
be focused in few large cities. Another prominent theory regarding the distribution of cities is derived
from Zipf’s Law and discussed in Gabaix (1999).
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spending. Taken literally, a 1 percent increase in the urban (total) population size leads
to a 2.2 percent increase (1.3 percent decrease) of government spending in specification
(2). It is interesting to note that once we include fixed effects these magnitudes drop
substantially, while remaining statistically significant. In an analysis on the impact of
population on government spending by Ram (2009) (using Penn World Table data), the
inclusion of country- and time-specific effects rendered population’s effect statistically
meaningless and changed its sign. Here this is not occurring. Thus, our model, and by
extension Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) in a panel data setting, is robust to accounting for
country- and time-specific heterogeneity. Including various control variables, as discussed
by Shelton (2007), leaves the positive effect from urban population significant at the
1 percent level with elasticities established around 0.2. The negative effect from total
population settles for a slightly larger magnitude.
Table 3 replicates table 2, using five year averages of all variables. We notice a remark-
able similarity between both tables throughout the different specifications, especially for
the urban and the population coefficient.21 Although the population effect briefly loses
significance along the way, it recovers its importance in the final and most complete speci-
fication. The lower significance levels in general might be owed to the stronger restrictions
of imposing fixed effects when using averages. As the number of observations per time
and country decreases substantially (e.g. from 51 to 10 observations if all information is
available for a country), less freedom remains for the coefficients to move. In general, we
note that the magnitude of the population effect appears to be stronger than the effect
from urbanization.
Overall, the main insights from our theoretical intuition are confirmed: urbanization
increases government spending, while pure population growth has a negative effect on
government spending, confirming Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). As people live closer to-
gether, more money is devoted to provide public amenities, whereas with just more people
the types of amenities being provided can be spread more evenly with fewer resources.
Further insights from tables 2 and 3 confirm that richer citizens demand more services
from their governments. However, this is not surprising as we are using total values, not
fractions. So, this finding merely confirms that public goods are normal goods. Openness
to trade is suggested to reduce government spending, which is interesting, especially given
the literature surrounding Rodrik (1998), who used cross-country data, and Ram (2009),
21Ram (2009) also found this strong similarity between using annual values and averages over time.
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who used panel data. We are using more countries and have a longer time frame than Ram
(2009). Finally, a larger share of the population being over 65 is suggested to increase
government spending and the same holds true for the fraction of people under 15. This
confirms findings by Shelton (2007) and one could speculate that people over 65 are in
favor of strong public retirement benefits and good health care coverage. As for people
under 15 years of age, one may argue that parents with children are probably in favor of
public funding for education, public safety, child benefits, and publicly funded sports and
leisure activities.
Two interesting extensions of our baseline model immediately come to mind. Following
the cross country growth literature (e.g. Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2008), we now
explore parameter heterogeneity on a regional level and investigate aggregation effects,
looking at specific forms of government spending, in this case education, health care, and
military expenditures.
5.1.1. Differences Across Regions
Table 4 presents regional estimates for our model, both using annual values and five
year averages. We focus on differences across what might mostly be considered as devel-
oping regions – Africa, Asia, and Latin America (LAC) – as well as differences stemming
directly from OECD and non-OECD countries. The results for the regional models us-
ing annual data suggest that both Africa and Asia confirm to the baseline predictions,
whereas the LAC region has flipped its sign (though still statistically significant). Aside
from the OECD estimates, we see the same relative magnitudes across regions: the esti-
mated effect of urban population size on government spending is smaller than that of the
estimated effect from total population size. The relative magnitude difference between
urban and total population across OECD and non-OECD countries is striking. In OECD
nations the effect of urbanization is three times as large as the total population effect,
while in non-OECD nations this relationship is basically reversed. Although speculative,
this might suggest a potential development threshold in how total population size impacts
government spending, but also an increased importance of the effect from urbanization
as countries grow richer.
Considering five year averages mostly confirms these results, although on lower signif-
icance levels. As above, a potential explanation could be less time variation when using
averages, in addition to a lower number of observations caused by splitting the sample
into regions.
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Beyond these two main estimated effects, we see that the impact of other control
variables mostly confirm our baseline results from tables 2 and 3. However, a couple of
interesting anomalies are standing out. Openness to trade seems to decrease government
size in Latin America and the OECD nations, whereas there is no clear relationship in the
rest of the world. Further, a higher population share under 15 years of age significantly
increases government spending all around the world, with the stark exceptions of Africa
and the OECD countries, where this relationship is reversed. With respect to Africa,
this might point to the argument of children being part of the retirement plan, which is
especially prevalent in very poor regions. Finally, democracy seems to raise government
spending in the OECD nations, while lowering it in Asia. Even though these results
are not the main focus of this paper, they do raise interesting questions. From looking
at regional differences, we now move to a detailed look at various forms of government
spending.
5.1.2. Differences Across Forms of Public Spending
Table 7 presents estimates based on specific categories of government spending, both
for annual values and five year averages. Consistent with the majority of our total govern-
ment spending findings, when we estimate our model subdividing government spending by
category (education, health care, military), we see for education and health care spending
the same pattern: a positive and statistically significant effect for urban population and a
negative and statistically significant effect for total population. We do not find estimated
population effects that are statistically significant for government spending on military.
These insights are consistent with five year averaging as well.
These baseline estimates are not surprising given our initial theory: living closer to
other people might either make one more compassionate to support better public health
and education programs or more concerned about one’s own health if we think about
transmittable illnesses and diseases. Yet military spending should mostly not be affected
by the geographical restrictions of the area one lives in.
Beyond these main results, it is noteworthy that whereas our earlier results yielded
little evidence in favor of the openness argument championed by Rodrik (1998) and but-
tressed by Ram (2009)’s panel data analysis, here subdividing by type of government
spending suggests that openness does have a positive and statistically significant effect
on both government spending for education and health care. Acknowledging this, we also
notice that the estimated effects for urban and total population swamp these openness
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effects, consistent with the main implications from Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). Further,
income seems to lose its importance in the context of all three categories of public spend-
ing, even returning negative significance when predicting public spending on health. Also
interesting from these government type results is the fact that life expectancy has a strong
positive impact on public spending. An intuition for this result could be that expecting a
longer life increases the expected future benefits from education. As expected, people over
65 value public health benefits stronger than education.22 Surprisingly, we find the same
result for young people under 15 – a result that leaves room for interpretation. Finally,
democratic societies seem to value public spending on education and health, whereas they
tend to decrease their focus on the military.
However, these results from different sectors of government spending should be in-
terpreted with some degree of caution. Switching from total government spending to
categorical government spending has reduced the available sample size considerably. In
the regression using educational spending our sample size has decreased by 65 percent.
One should also keep in mind that the majority of countries that did not have data on
specific categories of government spending are developing countries.
5.1.3. Robustness Checks
Table 6 presents results for several robustness checks, using specification (5) from table
2 as our baseline reference point.23 Column (1) uses ten year averages for all variables,
which allows to further control for measurement error and short-run fluctuations, similar
to the argument above for five year averages. Specifications (2) and (3) address potential
problems from reverse causality as we regress averages of government spending over five
and ten years (average from year t to year t + 5 or to year t + 10 respectively) on initial
annual observations of all explanatory variables (taken at time t). This should address
causality problems between the independent variables and the level of government spend-
ing. Especially in the cases of urbanization, income per capita, and openness to trade,
one could imagine that government size could affect these variables. Using future values
of the dependent variable should control for this problem.
Further, specification (4) displays our baseline regression excluding small countries
22Figlio and Fletcher (2012) also finds that the percentage of elderly adults relates negatively to the
support for public schooling.
23We choose specification (5) because it allows us to keep the grand majority of observations without
losing explanatory power, since the inclusion of the Polity IV index in specification (6) of table 2 is not
significant. However, all robustness checks return very similar results when including the Polity IV index.
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with a population of under one million. Given the general contemporary understanding
of urbanization thresholds, small countries with no or little potential of urbanization could
skew our results both in terms of significance and magnitude. Moving to specification (5),
we focus on the way we measure our variables. So far, we used the natural logarithm
of levels of government spending, the urbanized population, and also openness to trade.
However, various analyses measure government size as the share of government spending
in GDP. Similarly, oftentimes the urbanization rate is used as opposed to levels. Thus,
specification (5) uses rates as opposed to levels for the following variables: government
spending (fraction of GDP), urbanization (urban people divided by total population), the
logarithm of GDP per capita, trade (as percentage of GDP), and the population over 65
and under 15 as a percentage of total population (no logarithm).24 All other variables
remain unchanged.
Finally, column (6) replicates our baseline model with a balanced sample from 1960
until 2010. Thus, we are only using countries for which we have information for all 51
years of government spending, urbanized and total population, total GDP, openness to
trade, and life expectancy. We exclude both the population shares of people over 65 and
under 15 years of age, because of their reduced data availability. Specifications (4) and (6)
should make sure that our results are not driven by small countries or countries for which
we have little or no information. The latter point also relates to measurement error, as
most countries with complete information from 1960 to 2010 are the countries where data
reliability is potentially better and more consistent.
Looking at all the above described robustness checks in table 6 confirms our initial
results, as the coefficient associated with the urban population remains positive and sig-
nificant. Similarly, we confirm that plain population size has significantly negative effects
on government size. Also, the relative magnitudes of the effects from urbanization and
total population size are mostly confirmed with the exception of excluding small countries
(column 4) and the balanced sample (column 6). In these cases, urbanization comes out
to be at least as important as overall population size in predicting government size. This
result and the strong findings for OECD countries above suggest that urbanization might
be at least as strong as population in predicting government size for bigger and richer
countries.
24As mentioned before, the number of observations for the urbanization rate in the World Development
Indicators is substantially lower than the observations for urbanized and total population. We construct
the urbanization rate as number of urbanized people divided by total population.
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In summary, our baseline results are confirmed across various robustness checks, fo-
cusing on longer time frames (10 year averages), reverse causality between dependent and
independent variables, excluding small countries, using shares as opposed to levels, and
balancing our sample. We now move to our two national samples, in order to see whether
our theoretical predictions are also confirmed on a regional level within a country.
5.2. Country Specific Analyses
Studying government behavior on a country-specific level is useful in several dimen-
sions. Generically, it provides a further robustness check to our model’s main predictions.
Comparing states across time allows us to look at regional public administrations and
this serves as a useful aggregation check. Additionally, a change in the demand for some
public services is potentially first addressed on the state level, as opposed to the national
stage. We study both Colombia and Germany – countries with sizeable populations (47
and 82 million, respectively), which allows for regional urbanization rates. It is interesting
to see whether the urbanization effect prevails in both a growing as well as a developed
nation on the state level.
5.2.1. Analysis of Colombian Government Spending
Turning to Colombia, figure 5 shows that average urbanization across regions has been
rising consistently from under 60 percent in 1985 to over 68 percent in 2007. Regional
government size as a fraction of GDP has been fluctuating between under 8 percent and
16 percent, with its peak coming in 1995. Notice that government size is measured here
as public expenditure on the regional level, thus not including any government services
provided by the Colombian national government.
Table 7 looks at government spending amongst states (called departments in Colom-
bia). Columns 1 – 3 show results when using annual values and columns 4 – 6 display
results for five year averages. As in our international analysis, we find a strong positive
effect from urbanization on government spending with substantially higher magnitudes.
This is especially interesting since we did not find a positive effect for South American
countries in general – in fact, urbanization seemed to significantly decrease government
spending there. Further, we find no effect at all from overall population in our regional
sample for Colombia.
Other results from table 7 are in line with conclusions from our international sample.
Life expectancy has a negative influence on government spending, whereas higher GDP
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relates to bigger public sectors. Additionally, we must be careful to draw direct connec-
tions on the magnitude of the estimated effect of urban population in our Colombian
estimates. Recall that urbanization in this data set is measured as the number of people
living in the largest city in a state. Given this, it is not surprising that we witness a larger
impact of ‘urban’ population on government spending. As cities grow, regardless of size,
we expect that local governments will spend more to improve the city. As a robustness
check we re-estimated our model only using the largest cities in Colombia that exceeded
750,000 people.25 Doing so still yielded urban population to have an estimated effect of
0.87 in our baseline model.
5.2.2. Analysis of German Government Spending
Moving to our second state-level analysis, we now consider Germany in figure 6 and
table 8. Remember that our variables differ from our main specifications, as urbaniza-
tion is now measured as the amount of urban families. The total population of a state
is measured as total households, which could produce skewed urbanization rates when
dividing urban families by the number of overall households.26 However, if the average
size of families and households did not change over time and across regions, then we can
reasonably proxy for urbanization. Figure 6 displays the average regional development
of the urbanization rate (approximated as urban families divided by all households) and
relative government spending. Both variables move closely together before 2000, with no
clear correlation emerging after that. Public spending is relatively low throughout the
entire time frame, with a peak of about 9.2 percent. As in the Colombian sample however,
this measures public spending on the state level only, excluding any spending from the
national government.
After this general overview of the German regional data, we now turn to the regression
results in table 8. Notice that the German sample is smaller than the Colombian, with a
shorter time frame (16 versus 27 years) and fewer states (16 versus 25 in Colombia, with
data only being available for 13 German states). As in the Colombian table, columns 1
– 3 display results for annual values, whereas columns 4 – 6 display results for averages
over several years. Given the availability of data we decide to use 3-year averages, since
otherwise our sample would be too small to infer any reasonable conclusions. The same
reason led us to include regional dummies (East, North, and South with West being the
25750,000 has been used in another context as a threshold for urban areas by the World Bank.
26A family can live in various households, as well as a household could contain several families.
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omitted dummy) as opposed to state-specific fixed effects.
The German data confirms our intuition on any given level – adding regional dum-
mies and GDP for either annual or averaged values of public spending leaves the urban
coefficient positive and highly significant. The fact that magnitudes are only slightly
lower compared to our global results strengthens not only our qualitative, but also the
basic quantitative interpretations. As in the international results, it appears as if a 1 per-
cent increase in the amount of urban people would roughly lead to a 0.15 – 0.29 percent
rise in public spending.27 To illustrate the importance of this effect, consider Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg as an example: in this state, the amount of urban households increased
from 2.252 million in the year 2007 to 2.477 million in 2010. Given that state government
spending was 20.8 billion Euros in 2007, our results imply that urbanization caused an
increase of 0.31 – 0.62 billion Euros.
Consistent with our cross country analysis we see that total population size statistically
influences government spending, albeit in the opposite direction. Here the total population
effect dwarfs that of urbanization, being up to four times the magnitude. A possible
explanation here might be the unique dynamic of Germany, just years after reunification
and right around the time of the creation of the European Union, which opened borders
across Europe substantially. Further, as in most of our previous regressions, more income
means more government spending.
Overall, both national samples from Colombia and Germany draw conclusions in line
with our main results from the international sample. Urbanization appears to have a
consistent positive effect on the size of government, even in a state-level analysis. However,
one should not forget the smaller sample sizes from our Colombian and German data.
Because of this, we see these two country-level exercises as an addition to our main
results.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes urbanization as a driver of government size. In an urban area,
people live closer together and feel a stronger urge for a structured and detailed organiza-
tion of society. Our model extends the connection between population size to government
27Given the German involvement in the European Union and its switch to the EURO, we also tested
for the effect before or after the currency change. However, there were no significant differences in the
urban coefficient before or after. Similarly, in our international data set, it does not matter whether we
distinguish between EU and non-EU nations.
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spending provided by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), adding the distinction between urban
and rural citizens. We assume that the urban lifestyle exposes a person to more inter-
actions with more people, in addition to an increased sense of anonymity. This raises
the importance of many goods, which are typically provided by the government. For
instance, the importance of basic health standards is much more pronounced in a city
because contagious diseases could spread quickly, given the proximity to others (e.g. in
public transportation systems). The paper also discusses other publicly provided goods in
the context of urbanization, such as safety, education, income redistribution, public trans-
portation, or regulations. Using a CES utility framework, the model suggests a positive
effect from urbanization on the relative size of government spending.
The empirical section uses three samples to test our theory. First, we use an interna-
tional sample of 175 countries from 1960 – 2010 and find that urbanization does have a
positive and significant effect on government spending. A closer look at regional differ-
ences reveals that the effect holds with the exception of Latin America, but is over three
times as large in OECD countries. In addition, we test whether this effect differs across
parts of government spending. Urbanization seems to raise public spending on education
and health care, but has no effect on military spending. Finally, we use state-level samples
from Colombia and Germany to analyze our main theory on a more disaggregated level.
These results further strengthen the claim that urbanization is a positive and significant
predictor of government spending.
In addition to the general conclusions, our results also provide a hint towards another
anomaly prevailing in many countries: the distinct voting pattern of urban areas. For
example, in the United States most urban areas are voting for the Democratic candidate
in presidential elections, whereas rural areas tend to be more balanced or favor the Repub-
lican candidate. In fact, 49 of the 50 most dense counties voted Obama in 2012, whereas
49 of the 50 least dense counties voted Romney.28 Given that Democrats are generally in
favor of stronger government involvement in many issues, such as health care, education or
income distribution, our paper suggests a potential explanation for these regional differ-
ences in voting behavior. The urban lifestyle changes relative preferences towards goods
which are typically provided by the public sector. Another baﬄing example of cities vot-
ing differently is Germany: even though the current national government is a coalition of
the Christian Democratic Party (mostly seen as relatively conservative, center-right) and
28Discussed here for example: Florida and Johnson (2012).
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the Free Democratic Party (described as center-right and marked by free-market ideas),
the situation is very different in German cities. In fact, 9 out of the 10 biggest German
cities are currently governed by mayors associated with the center-left Social Democratic
Party or the Green Party, which are known to propose more government involvement in
numerous topics, such as health care, education, re-distributional policies etc.
Overall, our results imply that an increase in the amount of urban citizens by 1 percent
would cause a 0.15 to 0.3 percent rise in government spending, everything else equal. These
findings not only explain previous changes in government size, but also predict future
relationships. Given the United Nation’s prediction of the steady increase in worldwide
urbanization from 50 percent to about 57 percent within the next 12 years, the magnitude
of our results are considerable and suggest a worldwide increase in government spending
by 2.8 percent, ceteris paribus.
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Figures
Figure 1: Urban Agglomerations in 1975, proportion urban of the world: 37.2 %. World Urbanization
Prospects, the 2009 Revision.
Figure 2: Urban Agglomerations in 2009, proportion urban of the world: 50.1 %. World Urbanization
Prospects, the 2009 Revision.
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Figure 3: Urban Agglomerations in 2025, proportion urban of the world: 56.6 %. World Urbanization
Prospects, the 2009 Revision.
Figure 4: Average urbanization and average government size
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Figure 5: Urbanization and government size across Colombian regions, using the balanced sample from
1985 – 20070
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Figure 6: Urbanization and government size across German regions, using the balanced sample from
1996 – 2010
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Source Description
International data set, 175 countries, 1960 – 2010
lgov 21.823 (2.242) 5,049 WDI ln(General government final consumption ex-
penditure in constant 2000 US$)
lurban 15.203 (1.792) 5,049 WDI ln(urban population)
lpop 15.97 (1.729) 5,049 WDI ln(population)
lgdp 23.744 (2.147) 4,970 WDI ln(GDP in constant 2000 US$)
lopen 4.138 (0.604) 4,982 WDI ln(trade as % of GDP)
llife 4.168 (0.179) 5,006 WDI ln(life expectancy)
lpop65 1.763 (0.631) 5,079 WDI ln(fraction of population over 65 years of age)
lpop15 3.437 (0.363) 5,079 WDI ln(fraction of population under 15 years of age)
polity 2.615 (7.163) 4,552 Polity IV level of democracy, ranging from −10 (totally
autocratic) to +10 (total democracy); variable
polity2 in Polity IV
lgovedu 6.046 (0.581) 1,413 WDI ln(public spending on education in % of GDP)
lgovhea 5.715 (0.639) 1,969 WDI ln(public spending on health in % of GDP)
lgovmil 5.266 (0.739) 2,517 WDI ln(public spending on military in % of GDP).
Colombian regional data set, 25 regions, 1980 – 2007
lgov 11.885 (1.637) 552 DANE ln(current government spending in millions of
pesos)
lurban 13.480 (0.857) 552 DANE ln(amount of people living in the main city)
lpop 13.963 (0.708) 552 DANE ln(population)
lgdp 14.278 (1.626) 552 DANE ln(GDP in millions of pesos)
llife 4.244 (0.047) 552 DANE ln(life expectancy)
German regional data set, 13 states, 1995 – 2010
lgov 22.800 (0.862) 189 Stat. Bundesamt ln(total government spending in Euros)
lurban 6.695 (0.906) 189 Eurostat ln(amount of households living in densely-
populated areas with at least 500 inhabitants
per square kilometer)
lpop 7.608 (0.779) 189 Stat. Bundesamt ln(total amount of households)
lgdp 25.309 (0.943) 179 Stat. Bundesamt ln(GDP in Euros)
Notes:
WDI = World Development Indicators, provided by the World Bank; DANE = Departamento Admin-
istrativo Nacional de Estad´ıstica (National Bureau of Statistics Colombia); Statistisches Bundesamt =
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Federal Statistical Office Germany)
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Table 2: OLS results for annual values. Dependent variable is the logarithm of government consumption
(lgov).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lurban 0.989∗∗∗ 2.200∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.035) (0.056) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
lpop -1.326∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.091) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
lgdp 0.858∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
lopen -0.038∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
llife -0.117 -0.195∗ -0.142
(0.11) (0.112) (0.112)
lpop65 0.277∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.046)
lpop15 0.221∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.064)
polity 0.001
(0.001)
Two-way fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 5049 5049 5049 4883 4867 4441
R2 0.626 0.735 0.986 0.991 0.991 0.992
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Variables: lgov = ln(General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2000 US$));
lurban = ln(urban population); lpop = ln(population); lgdp = ln(GDP in constant 2000 US$);
lopen = ln(Trade as % of GDP); llife = ln(life expectancy);
lpop65 = ln(fraction of pop. over 65 years of age); lpop15 = ln(fraction of pop. under 15 years of age)
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Table 3: OLS results using five year averages of all variables. Dependent variable is the logarithm of
government consumption (lgov5).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lurban5 0.977∗∗∗ 2.172∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.195∗ 0.221∗ 0.243∗∗
(0.023) (0.076) (0.133) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
lpop5 -1.309∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗ -0.283 -0.288 -0.301∗
(0.071) (0.213) (0.176) (0.175) (0.177)
lgdp5 0.869∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052) (0.056)
lopen5 -0.060 -0.062 -0.023
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043)
llife5 -0.072 -0.151 -0.062
(0.258) (0.259) (0.259)
lpop655 0.282∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.110)
lpop155 0.249∗ 0.275∗
(0.136) (0.150)
polity5 0.001
(0.003)
Two-way fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 1041 1041 1041 1015 1002 911
R2 0.631 0.738 0.988 0.993 0.993 0.993
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Variables: lgov = ln(General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2000 US$));
lurban = ln(urban population); lpop = ln(population); lgdp = ln(GDP in constant 2000 US$);
lopen = ln(Trade as % of GDP); llife = ln(life expectancy);
lpop65 = ln(fraction of pop. over 65 years of age); lpop15 = ln(fraction of pop. under 15 years of age)
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Table 5: Looking at government expenditures on education, health, and military (lgovedu, lgovhea, and
lgovmil)
Annual Values 5-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lgovedu lgovhea lgovmil lgovedu lgovhea lgovmil
lurban 0.550∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ -0.075 0.589∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗ -0.025
(0.080) (0.151) (0.151) (0.104) (0.341) (0.290)
lpop -0.809∗∗∗ -0.802∗∗∗ 0.143 -0.742∗∗∗ -0.833∗ 0.155
(0.157) (0.212) (0.220) (0.185) (0.469) (0.440)
lgdp -0.021 -0.121∗∗ -0.083 -0.037 -0.154 -0.0673
(0.064) (0.061) (0.071) (0.079) (0.099) (0.131)
lopen 0.096∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.038 0.181∗∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.091
(0.055) (0.040) (0.040) (0.066) (0.087) (0.090)
llife 0.861∗∗∗ 0.177 -0.336∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.426 -0.446
(0.245) (0.211) (0.160) (0.288) (0.485) (0.346)
lpop65 -0.221∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.099 -0.167 0.202 -0.005
(0.117) (0.103) (0.115) (0.158) (0.240) (0.312)
lpop15 -0.342∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ -0.108 -0.423∗ 0.471∗∗ -0.062
(0.168) (0.116) (0.145) (0.229) (0.217) (0.295)
polity 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Two-way fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1561 2226 2858 725 454 657
R2 0.573 0.919 0.853 0.787 0.954 0.871
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Variables: lgov = ln(General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2000 US$));
lurban = ln(urban population); lpop = ln(population); lgdp = ln(GDP in constant 2000 US$);
lopen = ln(Trade as % of GDP); llife = ln(life expectancy);
lpop65 = ln(fraction of pop. over 65 years of age); lpop15 = ln(fraction of pop. under 15 years of age)
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Table 6: Various robustness checks. Dependent variable is the logarithm of government consumption
(lgov) in columns 1 – 4 and 6. Column 5 uses government spending as share of GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
urban 0.304∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 2.656∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.107) (0.134) (0.056) (1.444) (0.0540)
pop -0.441∗∗ -0.293∗ -0.368∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -5.837∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.162) (0.193) (0.087) (0.561) (0.0793)
gdp 0.800∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.049) (0.066) (0.025) (0.323) (0.0316)
open -0.050 -0.014 0.053 -0.022 0.009∗∗ -0.0374
(0.071) (0.038) (0.054) (0.020) (0.003) (0.0287)
life -0.160 -0.105 0.112 -0.078 -3.741∗∗∗ -0.618∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.244) (0.315) (0.117) (1.232) (0.123)
pop65 0.287∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.099) (0.157) (0.045) (0.063)
pop15 0.260 0.239∗ 0.216 0.206∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.208) (0.132) (0.201) (0.064) (0.023)
Two-way fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 539 983 511 4415 6534 2295
R2 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.991 0.665 0.993
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Using the Colombian dataset, available time frame 1985 – 2007. Dependent variable is the
logarithm of government consumption (lgov).
Annual values 5-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lurban 1.021∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗ 1.009∗∗ 0.824∗∗
(0.231) (0.211) (0.205) (0.483) (0.385) (0.369)
lpop 0.201 -0.245 0.036 0.168 -0.173 0.094
(0.281) (0.243) (0.244) (0.587) (0.421) (0.416)
lgdp 0.142∗∗ 0.143
(0.060) (0.115)
llife -3.425∗∗∗ -3.273∗∗∗
(0.648) (0.947)
Two-way fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 552 552 552 120 120 120
R2 0.383 0.990 0.990 0.405 0.994 0.995
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Variables: lgov = ln(gov’t spending in millions of pesos, nominal);
lurban = ln(# of people living in the main city or “headtown” (cabecera)); lpop = ln(population);
lgdp = ln(nominal GDP in millions pesos); llife = ln(life expectancy).
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Table 8: Using the German dataset, available time frame 1995 – 2010. Dependent variable is the loga-
rithm of government consumption (lgov).
Annual values 5-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lurban 0.277∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.049) (0.055) (0.052)
lpop 0.788∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.092) (0.061) (0.065) (0.145)
east -0.145∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.124∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.025) (0.041) (0.042) (0.065)
north -0.135∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030)
south -0.092∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033)
lgdp 0.396∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.145)
N 189 189 179 65 65 65
R2 0.986 0.990 0.991 0.987 0.991 0.992
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Variables: lgov = ln(total public spending on the state level);
lurban = ln(households living in densely-populated areas); lpop = ln(population);
lgdp = ln(GDP).
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Appendix A. Comparative Statics in the General Model
In order to derive 9, we first derive
(
G
Y
)s =
(g˘ + sg˘s)(sy˘ + ny˙)− y˘(sg˘ + ng˙)
Y 2
(A.1)
from equation 8. Similarly,
(
G
Y
)n =
g˙(sy˘ + ny˙)− y˙(sg˘ + ng˙)
Y 2
. (A.2)
Now we can take the difference between (G
Y
)s and (
G
Y
)n to get
(
G
Y
)s − (G
Y
)n =
1
Y 2
[
sg˘sY + g˘ny˙ − g˙ny˘ − g˙sy˘ + g˘sy˙
]
. (A.3)
Simplifying terms and using the definition of s+ n = P then leads to
(
G
Y
)s − (G
Y
)n =
1
Y
[
sg˘s +
P
Y
(g˘y˙ − g˙y˘)
]
(A.4)
and from there to equation 9.
Appendix B. The Effect of Urbanization on Government Spending – CES
Example
Rearranging equations 12 and 15 from the CES example, we can write
g˘ =
y˘(s+ n)
γ(1 + A)
and g˙ =
y˙(s+ n)
γ(1 +B)
. (B.1)
Using these results in 9 then provides
(
G
Y
)s − (G
Y
)n =
1
Y
[
sg˘s +
P y˘y˙
Y
(
P
γ(1 + A)
− P
γ(1 +B)
)]
, (B.2)
from which we derive equation 16. To see that g˘s > 0, we can rewrite equation 12 as
g˘ =
y˘
γ
(
1
s+n
+ γ
µ
α
1−α (s)
δ
α−1 (s+ n)
1
α−1
) . (B.3)
As the exponent in the denominator associated with s is negative for any α < 1 (s + n
remains unchanged since overall population does not change during the urbanization
process), this confirms g˘s > 0.
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